Sudan’s Civil War Explained
A photograph of Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan pictured in front of the Sudanese flag.
By Jim Wells ‘26
On March 6, 2024, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) Executive Director, Cindy McCain, issued a statement warning that “the war in Sudan risks triggering the world’s largest hunger crisis.” As of March 2024, the United Nations estimated that over 18 million people in Sudan face food insecurity, while 5 million face starvation. In addition to food shortages, violence has plagued the region since the onset of the current conflict in April 2023. As of January 2024, independent monitors for the United Nations estimated that the Western Sudanese city of El Geneina alone saw between 10,000 and 15,000 lives lost due to the conflict. Although new developments regarding the conflict in Sudan occur daily, these recent events are but a continuation of a tragic narrative that has plagued the Sudanese people for decades.
A Brief Anthropological and Historical Analysis of Sudan
The earliest history of what encompasses the land known as modern-day Sudan dates back to Mesolithic times when hunter-gatherer tribes occupied the region. This geographical area, known to scholars today as the region of Nubia, allowed early humans to abandon their hunter-gatherer lifestyle to establish permanent settlements along the Nile River. Towards the end of the Neolithic period, around 3000 B.C.E., these Nubian tribes began domesticating animals, establishing agricultural outposts, and developing communities throughout the region. While the Nubian people continually occupied the region under various regimes, beginning with the Ancient Egyptians in the Early Dynastic Period, the borders of modern-day Sudan did not begin to take shape until the 19th century A.D.
In 1820, an Egyptian army led by Muhammed ‘Ali, a viceroy of the Ottoman Empire, invaded Sudan. Lured by natural resources in the area, the Egyptian army quickly overpowered the Sudanese forces in Northern Sudan, and by 1821, the Sultan of Darfur had surrendered, abdicating control of the region. While the rule of the Egyptians initially manifested as oppression of the Sudanese people, over the following decades, proxy rulers began to implement policies that benefited the region’s inhabitants. This included the expansion of trade routes and implementation of a more equitable tax system by Governor General ʿAlī Khūrshīd Āghā in 1826, as well as the introduction of more advanced Western technology by Ismāʿīl Pasha in 1863.
British forces invaded Egypt in 1882 to further their financial interests and expand colonial rule within the region. Through their occupation of Egypt, British forces, by proxy, had also acquiesced responsibility for Sudan, which had fallen under the control of Mohammed Ahmed bin Abdullah that same year when his forces successfully campaigned against Egyptian-Ottoman rule. Claiming direct descendance from the Prophet Muhammad, Mohammed Ahmed bin Abdullah proclaimed himself “al-Mahdī,” translated to mean “the guided one.” In 1883, recognizing a threat to their occupational rule, British forces launched an attack on Ahmed’s army, known as the Mahdists. However, despite their superior technology, the British were defeated and temporarily evacuated the area.
In 1885, Mohammed Ahmed bin Abdullah died, and the Mahdist movement gradually devolved into infighting. Recognizing an opportunity to reassert their control over the region, British forces launched a campaign of reconquest in 1896. Led by Major-General Herbert Kitchener, a coalition of Anglo-Egyptian troops gradually conquered swaths of land within the region, culminating in the Battle of Omdurman in September 1898. Despite their overwhelming numerical superiority, the spears and arrows of the Mahdists were no match for the rifles and cannons of the British. In total, the Mahdists suffered over 20,000 casualties, while the British incurred only 500. This decisive outcome dissolved the power of the Mahdist movement and cemented British rule within the region.
British Rule and The Road to Sudanese Independence
Firmly in control of both Egypt and Sudan but daunted by the task of governing such a vast geographical area, the British and Egyptians came to an agreement in 1899 that would be known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. This treaty established a border along the 22° North parallel, separating Egypt's territory from Sudan's. Despite ongoing disputes over some of the surrounding territory, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium's border remains internationally accepted. The Condominium Agreement also established a joint power-sharing agreement in which an Egyptian Governor-General would have direct rule over the region but would only be appointed by the British Parliament. This subsequently resulted in a de facto British rule of Sudan, effectively transforming the region into another colony of the monarchy.
As feelings of alienation began to manifest among the Sudanese people, instances of nationalism became more prevalent. In 1924, ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, a leader of the Sudanese nationalist movement, founded the White Flag League. Committed to the idea of Sudanese independence and the removal of British forces from their land, the White Flag League conducted multiple demonstrations in the capital city of Khartoum. The British suppressed their efforts, but Sudanese nationalist sentiments continued to rise throughout the country.
In February of 1953, following a coup d’état in Egypt, the British and Egyptian governments signed an agreement that granted the right of national self-determination to the Sudanese people by 1956. This agreement resulted in elections for control of Sudan, with the Egyptians supporting Ismāʿīl al-Azharī, the leader of Sudan’s Nation Unionist Party (NUP). Campaigning on the promise of a “United Nile Valley” that would unify Egypt and Sudan, al-Azharī won the election. Shortly following his election, however, al-Azharī chose to forgo his campaign promises, and on January 1, 1956, he declared Sudan an independent republic.
From Democracy to Genocide
While achieving independence gave some reason for optimism, this victory would prove to be a pyrrhic one for the Sudanese people. Over the decades from their initial independence until the late 1980s, Sudan would be embroiled in multiple civil wars, resulting in the deaths and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Sudanese people. These wars also brought unrest in the political sphere, resulting in a myriad of attempted coups-d’états between 1958-1989, four of which were successful. This collection of unrest culminated in June 1989, when a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) led by General Omar al-Bashir seized power.
Some of the reforms Bashir imposed during his 30-year rule were typical of other authoritarian leaders and mirrored the aspirations of some of his predecessors. These reforms included but were not limited to, the banning of trade unions, imprisonment of political opponents, suppression of media outlets, dissolution of the judiciary, and reintroduction of corporal punishment. Unlike his predecessors, however, Omar al-Bashir recognized the inherent threat to his rule in Sudan. Given the country’s history of power struggles and military takeovers, Bashir implemented a strategy not previously seen in Sudan. This strategy, known as coup-proofing, is one in which a ruler surrounds himself with various subordinate factions, all of which are loyal to him but none of which individually possess the resources to overthrow him.
Motivated by these reforms, deteriorating economic conditions, and opposition to Bashir’s implementation of Sharia Law, conflict in the southern part of the country became more prevalent as rebel groups sought to establish a more free and secular state. In response, Bashir sent one of his loyal factions, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), to quash any uprising in the region. In addition, local militias loyal to Bashir quickly spread this civil unrest to the western side of the country.
In 2003, as rebel groups in the western region of Darfur revolted in an attempt to protest their oppressive government, Bashir provided monetary assets and weapons to Arab militias in the region in an attempt to subdue the uprising. These militias, known as the Janjaweed, were particularly brutal and used their assets to perpetrate unspeakable violence against civilians by terrorizing villages and refusing to allow international aid into the region. Between 2003 and 2005, an estimated 200,000 civilians in the Darfur region died from violence, starvation, or pestilence, while approximately 2 million more were displaced, leading then Secretary of State Colin Powell to declare the crisis a genocide. Despite the brutality of both the Janjaweed and the SAF, the efficacy of their employment in his coup-proofing strategy proved their value to Bashir, with both factions becoming key elements in his quest to maintain power.
A New Nation Forms
In July 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorized a joint peacekeeping mission with African Union coalition troops in the Darfur Region. After an investigation conducted by international lawmakers yielded an assessment of atrocities, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Bashir in 2009. This development did little to deter Bashir’s autocratic rule of Sudan, however, and in 2010, he was re-elected President with approximately 68% of the vote. The legitimacy of these results has been heavily scrutinized.
In keeping with the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the southern portion of Sudan held a referendum in 2011. Recognizing the value of the oil fields scattered throughout the south, Bashir sent Sudanese troops into Abyei and other southern regions in an effort to minimize the loss of land should the south declare independence. While this development initially sparked fears of another civil war, the African Union deployed Ethiopian peacekeeping troops, and large-scale violence was deterred. Fed up with Bashir’s authoritarianism and anti-secular implementation of Sharia Law throughout the nation, on July 9, 2011, leaders in the south voted in favor of becoming an independent state, thus separating Sudan and South Sudan into separate countries.
Troubled by Sudan’s deteriorating economic circumstances due to losing vast swaths of its oil resources to the south, Bashir sought to consolidate his power. In 2013, he granted official status to Janjaweed militias, renaming them The Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Led by Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, also known by his nickname, “Hemedti,” this group would prove to be a key factor in Bashir’s undoing.
By 2018, stark opposition to Bashir’s leadership had become widespread throughout Sudan. The first signs of unrest came with the publication of Sudan’s budget, which allocated approximately two-thirds of the country’s assets to the security sector while Sudanese civilians struggled to meet basic needs. Triggered by outrage over the allocation of these monetary resources, the turn of the calendar year was marked by large-scale protests throughout the town of ʿAṭbarah, the capital city of Khartoum, and various other parts of the country. Organized by leading members of both the SAF and RSF after months of unrest, Bashir was finally ousted from power in a military coup d’état in April 2019, marking the end of one of the most brutal and longest-reigning regimes in Sudan’s history.
The Conflict Takes Its Modern Shape
Following the end of Bashir’s reign, a power struggle began between Hemedti and his RSF militia and Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan, the former regional commander in Darfur who had taken command of the SAF. Seeing both men as complicit in the violence in Darfur, pro-democracy protests continued throughout the nation. Recognizing that a Democratic Sudan would virtually end his quest to rule the country, Hemedti ordered his RSF soldiers to disrupt the protests. This culminated in the execution of 100 protestors at a sit-in demonstration on June 3, 2019. Following this event, various world governments, including the United States and its Arab allies, intervened and convinced both leaders to come to the negotiating table in an attempt to restore peace throughout Sudan.
Hemedti and Burhan signed a power-sharing agreement as a result of this intervention. This agreement stipulated that civilians and military members would share control of Sudan through a transitional council until the 2022 elections. These terms dictated that a military officer would lead the council for 21 months and civilians for 18 months. Despite warnings from Sudanese protestors, the international committee initially appointed Burhan as chairman and Hemedti as vice chairman of the council.
In its early stages, the council worked as intended and installed a new prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok. However, this cooperation was short-lived, as Hemedti and Burhan organized a staged coup, leading to Hamdok’s resignation as Prime Minister in January 2022. Once again, this made Burhan the de facto leader of Sudan, with Hemedti as his second-in-command. Pressure from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates brought Hemedti and Burhan back to the negotiating table after a year of protests.
All parties signed a framework deal to conclude this new round of negotiations on December 5, 2022. The deal outlined a path for Sudan to establish a newly formed, civilian-led transitional government by April 2023. While all parties signed the deal, a key disagreement arose between Hemedti and Burhan. Under the terms of the agreement, the RSF was to be absorbed into the SAF, thus vastly limiting Hemedti’s power. Burhan proposed a two-year timeline for this process, while Hemedti proposed a ten-year timeline. This disagreement created a rift between the two men, leading to the existence of the conflict in its modern condition.
Since the fighting began in April 2023, both armies have been responsible for the deaths of countless innocent Sudanese people. Burhan has used the SAF’s Air Force to indiscriminately bomb regions of the country controlled by Hemedti’s forces, killing numerous civilians and displacing entire villages from their homes. Conversely, Hemedti’s control of the gold mines in the western part of the country has provided a seemingly endless stream of revenue for his war machine. These resources have enabled him to employ a continuous flow of weapons and new RSF fighters that have implemented brutal tactics similar to those of their Janjaweed predecessors.
The Path Forward
Since April 2023, there have been multiple instances of attempted intervention by the international community. These attempts, however, have proved futile, as cease-fire agreements have been routinely violated, and peace talks between the two warring factions have amounted to nothing. In March 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), a global authority on food security, issued a statement calling for immediate action by the international community in order to “prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods and avert a catastrophic hunger crisis in Sudan.”
However, the fighting makes it difficult to transport international aid to those in need. Coupled with the continual displacement of farmers from their land, some experts offer a bleak outlook on what could transpire if circumstances do not change. The Clingendael Institute, a Dutch think tank, argues that if immediate, severe action is not taken, up to one million Sudanese people could die of starvation by June 2024.
Furthermore, other nations appear hesitant to get involved in this unfolding catastrophe. The government of Saudi Arabia expressed disinterest in hosting another round of peace talks following the failure of the previous round in Jeddah in October 2023. Other nations in the region have been alleged to be occupying a more nefarious position, with a United Nations report alleging the sale of weapons by the United Arab Emirates to the RSF. The Emirate government has denied these claims.
At a press conference on March 26, 2024, U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, Tom Perriello, stated that the United States hopes to resume peace talks with both of Sudan’s warring factions in April 2024. While an exact date is unclear, Perriello expressed the unlikelihood that any talks would occur before the end of Ramadan. Meanwhile, on March 21, the U.S. State Department announced a $47 million aid package for Sudan and neighboring countries like Chad and South Sudan, where Sudanese refugees have sought shelter from the fighting.
The path forward remains complex and uncertain. As the severity of the conflict increases daily, the international community remains largely hesitant to address this humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, neither the SAF nor the RSF have expressed a desire to negotiate over a potential ceasefire agreement. While many outlets have offered a bleak forecast of future events in Sudan, some still maintain that peace and prosperity are attainable goals. How to accomplish these aspirations remains unclear.