Thai Politics: Breaking The Cycle
Pita Limjaroenrat (left), former leader of the Move Forward Party, and Chaithawat Tulathon, the party’s current leader, at a news conference at Parliament in Bangkok, Thailand, January 31, 2024. Sakchai Lalit via AP Photo.
By Mai Kasemsawade ‘26
During last year’s spring, democracy bloomed again in Thailand as a record-breaking number of voters cast their ballots to unseat the military-backed incumbent who has ruled the kingdom since 2014. The Move Forward Party, representing the opposition, clinched a narrow majority, securing victories across the country, even in the traditional strongholds of the political heavyweight Pheu Thai Party. The atmosphere was electric as crowds fervently chanted “Nai Yok” (Prime Minister) to welcome Pita Limjaroenrat, the leader of the Move Forward Party, slated to become the first civilian to helm the country in nearly a decade. It was a moment charged with emotion, brimming with renewed hope, as the historic election promised a fresh dawn for Thai politics, steering away from populism towards a path of social progress.
Fast forward one year later, and the Thai Parliament is led by the premiership of Srettha Thavisin, presiding over the coalition of Pheu Thai and military-backed parties. The Move Forward Party now faces the looming threat of dissolution, while Pita and 44 of Move Forward's current and former lawmakers are confronting the prospect of lifetime bans from political involvement. How did we get here?
Thai Politics 101
If you complete a course on Thai politics, your first takeaway is turbulence. Over its 90 years of democracy, Thailand has weathered 13 successful coups and 9 unsuccessful attempts, averaging nearly one coup every 7 years. The Thai Parliament has been dissolved 14 times, either as a means to stifle opposition or to pave the way for new elections. This includes the most recent dissolution of the junta-backed Parliament in 2023. Moreover, the fragmentation of political coalitions often results in gridlock, hampering the passage of crucial legislation as various factions vie for strategic advantage.
The second takeaway is the so-called “vicious cycle.” Thailand’s turbulent political landscape has hampered the establishment of robust checks and balances and hindered the development of civilian governance independent of military influence. Consequently, Thai democracy grapples with patronage-based political structures and recurrent interventions by the military.
The cycle looks something like this: elected politicians implement policies aimed at securing support from bureaucrats and giant corporations. Once the corruption scandals come to light, parliamentary dissolution becomes a compelling choice for the ruling party under fire. Meanwhile, the opposition initiates “mob politics,” in which public dissatisfaction is mobilized, pinning the fragmented polity against each other. As people take to the streets and the country teeters on the brink of civil unrest, the military steps in, claiming to cleanse the political landscape and restore stability. The junta administration then rewrites the constitution to absolve themselves of staging the coup and fortify their political advantage in the next round of elections. The pattern is tried and true. So far, Thailand has written 20 constitutions, with the latest version ratified in April 2017, making it one of the countries with the most constitutions in the world.
The Modern Political Context
To understand the current situation, we need to rewind back two election cycles. In 2001, the Thai Rak Thai Party, the predecessor of Phue Thai led by the former political official turned telecommunications business tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra, swept a landslide victory. Thaksin’s administration expanded spending in healthcare, rural development, and farming subsidies, aimed at securing the voter base in rural areas. Dubbed “Thaksinomics,” these populist policies earned Thai Rak Thai immense support. In 2001, Thaksin’s cabinet became the first in Thai history to serve a full four-year term, and in 2005, he secured the largest majority for reelection, garnering 377 out of 500 parliamentary seats.
With Thaksin’s unprecedented popularity, the Thai conservative forces, including the military, viewed him as a threat to the monarchy, which is the core of the established Thai political tradition. Thaksin also had his own flaws: intolerance to criticism, abusing political power to seek business interests, and, most aggravating of all, launching a war on drugs that resulted in over 2,000 extrajudicial killings of suspected traffickers and prolonged the conflict in Thailand’s deep south.
When it became known that the Shinawatra family had used tax loopholes in the sales of its telecommunications company Shin Corp., the anti-Thaksin movement, or the “yellow shirts,” erupted in 2006. The military stepped in while Thaksin was abroad, claiming to end the protests and restore order. The coup pitted his supporters, the “red shirts,” especially those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds who had benefited from his policies, against the urban elites, royalists, and the military. Thus began the deep polarization that would last for almost two decades.
After another cycle of rewriting the constitution, an electoral victory for the Democratic Party, and a parliamentary dissolution, Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra led the Phue Thai party to yet another landslide victory in the 2011 election. Amid the Yingluck administration’s controversial rice subsidy scheme and an ambitious attempt at political amnesty for Thaksin, the yellow and red shirt protesters locked horns again. Demonstrations quickly turned violent, and the military launched the 2014 coup. Democracy came to a pause, and the new cycle started.
State of The Game
The junta government ratified the 20th Constitution in 2017, writing the rules for the current power game. There are two key players with significant political influence, the first being the 250 military-appointed senators who represent the interests of the conservatives and the establishment. In the two most recent elections, the Senate played a pivotal role in the selection of the prime minister. In 2019, following allegations of vote-buying and fraud in a contested election, the senate secured the prime minister seat for coup leader Prayuth Chan-ocha.
The second player is the constitutional court, which validated the junta’s proposed constitutional framework, legalized systemic cooperation through the senate, and delivered rulings that stifled political opposition. Following the 2019 election, the court disqualified Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, the rising opposition figure and the leader of the Future Forward Party (FFP), from serving in Parliament. Shortly after, the court ruled for the dissolution of the opposition party under the allegations of illicit political funding.
The rulings sparked nationwide anti-government protest rallies throughout 2020. Most notable were the youth protests, the “White Ribbon Movement,” in which high school students stood in solidarity against the conservative political faction. The government imposed restrictions on public gatherings to combat the pandemic, petering out protests as online dissatisfaction grew.
Prayuth’s Parliament was dissolved in March 2023, several months before the election in May, granting Prayuth more time to campaign and rally for political allies. The Move Forward Party (MFP), FFP’s successor party, defied poll predictions and clinched 151 parliamentary seats, narrowly surpassing Pheu Thai’s 141 seats, marking the first time since 2001 that Pheu Thai failed to win an electoral majority. With a total of 500 parliamentary seats and an additional 250 seats in the senate, candidate Pita needed 367 bicameral votes to become Prime Minister. In the initial parliamentary vote, Pita Limjaroenrat secured only 324 seats. After the Constitutional Court accepted charges of electoral fraud against Pita, a decisive majority of 395 legislators voted to prevent his second nomination, effectively blocking his candidacy for Prime Minister.
Pheu Thai found itself in a pivotal position to lend support to either the MFP or the military-backed factions to form a government. Recognizing the political sensitivity surrounding the MFP’s reformist agenda, particularly its demands for military and lese-majeste law reforms, Pheu Thai formed a coalition with military-backed parties, despite espousing an anti-military stance during Prayuth’s premiership. Ultimately, Pheu Thai emerged victorious as the party’s candidate and business tycoon, Srettha Thavisin, received the majority vote and became Thailand’s 30th Prime Minister.
Srettha’s election came on the same day as Thaksin Shinawatra, Pheu Thai’s de facto leader, returned to the kingdom after more than 15 years of self-imposed exile. He spent six months serving time for corruption-related charges in a luxury hospital room. Experts have speculated that a deal to soften his sentence was part of Pheu Thai agreeing to the coalition. After his release on parole in February 2024, he has been campaigning in Chiang Mai, Pheu Thai’s traditional stronghold, stealing the spotlight from Srettha and reclaiming his position in the party. Moreover, there have also been talks of efforts to help Yingluck return to the country.
Meanwhile, Pita faced allegations of illicit shareholding of a media firm, ITV Pcl, which has now ceased operation. The allegations could have revoked Pita’s status as a lawmaker. While the Constitutional Court cleared Pita’s allegations in January, on April 3rd the Constitutional Court accepted the petition from Thailand’s Election Commission alleging that the MFP committed high treason by advocating reform of Penal Code Section 112 on lese-majeste, which could entail the maximum 10-year ban from politics on MFP executives under Section 92 of the Act on Political Parties. The Court filed the petition without providing the MFP with an opportunity to refute the allegations. The ruling is expected in May. The promise of change was stymied, and Thai politics followed the same path, serving the interests of the establishment and elite factions.
Moving Forward
Despite the cascade of discouraging events, Thailand’s new political environment still holds hopeful prospects for the country. The White Ribbon Movement and the emergence of the youth indicated a new potent electoral force that seeks to promote democracy, having lived their childhood and teenage years under military rule. Recent polls have shown that Pita’s popularity is leading that of PM Srettha. With the term of the appointed senate coming to an end, an election for the senate will be held soon. Moreover, the cabinet has approved holding a referendum to amend the military-written constitution.
Breaking the cycle is a journey of unwavering efforts in repeated rounds of political duels. In spite of the uncertainties and unpredictable nature of Thai politics, one thing is certain: whenever democracy is pruned, it will always bloom again.