Fractures Across the Continent: Right-Wing Populism and the European Union
By Michelle Miao ‘26
On September 25, far-right leader Giorgia Meloni was elected the new prime minister of Italy, becoming the head of Italy’s most right-wing government since World War II. Meloni’s party, Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI), was founded in 2012 but has roots in the neo-fascist movement formed in 1946 by allies of Benito Mussolini. Though Meloni has attempted to tone down this connection in recent years, her party has failed to completely dissociate from its fascist background. This election cycle saw the victory of a candidate who years ago lauded Hitler as a “great statesman,” and during her early years in politics, Meloni herself praised Mussolini as a "good politician."
Meloni’s government sharply contrasts with the previous coalition led by technocrat and European Union-insider Mario Draghi, marking a reckoning for Italy—but this is not an isolated incident. For years, support for right-wing populist parties within Europe has been on the rise, in countries ranging from Poland to France, a trend that severely calls into question the feasibility of a united, democratic EU.
What Happened in Italy?
In July, former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s parliamentary coalition collapsed after one of its members, the Five Star Movement (MS5), boycotted a crucial vote of confidence for Draghi that included a multi-billion euro aid package to address high costs of living. MS5, one of Italy’s main political parties, demanded an increase in government borrowing to offset high living costs and opposed other key projects such as a provision to install an incinerator in Rome. Draghi offered his resignation as a result, but was denied by President Sergio Mattarella. However, after a second confidence vote was held in which three parties refused to take part, Draghi again tendered his resignation, which was officially accepted and triggered the September snap election that handed power to Meloni and her right-wing allies.
During Draghi’s year and a half in office, FdI had acted as the sole opposition party and had come to symbolize discontent with his coalition—and it reaped the benefits. It had received just 4% of the vote in Italy’s 2018 parliamentary election, but won 26% of the vote in 2022, the greatest percentage out of the parties forming the right-wing coalition.
Since her victory, Meloni has attempted to soften her image as a nationalist firebrand and distance her party from the fascist ideology surrounding its founding. Despite calling for Italy to leave the Eurozone in 2014, she has now backtracked slightly by promising to remain within Europe’s institutions. Though she criticized imposing sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Crimea, she recently pledged Italy’s unwavering support to Ukraine and NATO, stating that “Italy will never be the weak link in the West.”
However, Meloni still retains traditional hard-right stances on many issues: she is against marriage equality, LGBTQ+ adoptions and surrogate motherhood, supports tight controls on migration, has expressed belief in the Great Replacement Theory, and has made ambivalent comments on the right to abortion.
Right-Wing Populism Across the EU
Sweden
The rise of FdI is far from an outlier. Less than two weeks before Meloni’s victory, the general election in Sweden handed a narrow majority to a right-wing coalition that included the Sweden Democrats (SD), a party founded with roots in Swedish fascism and the neo-Nazi movement. SD now holds the second-highest number of seats in Parliament and is the largest party within its coalition. By leveraging its anti-immigrant message in the face of a wave of gang violence and crimes linked with immigration, the party won 20.5% of the vote. Since winning just 5.7% in 2010, SD has swelled from a fringe group to one of national prominence. Though they will hold no cabinet positions after being blocked by a coalition partner, they are nonetheless expected to exert notable sway over government policy. Leery of further European integration and multiculturalism, SD may also influence the Swedish presidency of the Council of the European Union that begins in January 2023.
Hungary and Poland
Moreover, since the 2010s, Hungary and Poland have presented as two of the EU’s greatest challenges following the rise of hard-right populist parties that eroded the independence of governmental institutions and led to democratic backsliding in both countries.
In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party won an overwhelming victory in the 2010 general election, which gave Orban free reign to implement nationalist policies and constitutional changes that would cement his power. Orban, who famously described his country as an “illiberal democracy,” aggressively touted the importance of national sovereignty against European encroachment, the superiority of Christian values, and the need to insulate Hungary from foreign immigration. Fidesz took advantage of its parliamentary supermajority to gradually restrict opposition parties, independent media, the judicial system, and the civic and public sectors. In spite of this, surveys show a generally positive view of Orban’s performance from Hungarian citizens who are drawn to Orban’s ethnonationalist messaging.
Similarly in Poland, the Christian nationalist party Law and Justice (PiS) founded by brothers Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński swept into power in 2015 after winning enough seats in the parliamentary election to govern alone. PiS, a party that strongly opposes gay marriage, abortion, and immigration, has claimed to be the only party that truly represents the public interest,
whereas other parties that control Polish institutions are filled with “postcommunist elites” interested only in enriching themselves and their allies. Kaczyński has also maintained that the Polish constitution renders it impossible for his government to “fulfill the nation’s will,” and has used this as a pretense for severely curtailing independent media, civil society, and other branches of government. In particular, the independent judiciary has been severely shackled, with rules changed to remove impartial officials and replace them with PiS sympathizers.
France
Even countries like France, a major EU leader, have experienced a rising of the populist tide. In the most recent presidential election this April, Marine Le Pen of the far-right Rassemblement National party (RN) received a significant increase in support compared to the prior election. President Emmanuel Macron easily won the 2017 election with 66% of the vote compared to Le Pen’s 33%; in 2022, his portion shrunk to 58% while Le Pen’s soared to 41%. At times during the campaign season, polls showed the two candidates within a mere two percentage points of one another, an unthinkable margin had it been just 5 years earlier.
Macron, who entered the presidential race in 2017 as an outsider and a firm centrist, promised an era of change. However, despite assurances that he would do everything in his power to make sure citizens “no longer have any reason to vote for the extremes,” the aftermath of his first mandate saw support for the RN surge to record heights.
This stands in sharp contrast to 2002, when Marine Le Pen’s father Jean-Marie, then-president of the RN, sent shockwaves through the French establishment by entering the second round of presidential elections against incumbent president Jacques Chirac. After a perfect storm of factors gave him the percentage of votes needed, protestors took to the streets to denounce his xenophobic platform. Chirac refused to face Le Pen in debate, stating he could not “accept the trivialisation of intolerance and hatred.” Two decades later, the electoral landscape is dramatically different. Jean-Marie’s nearly 20% of the vote during the first round was shocking and seen as resembling a protest vote; this election cycle, Marine Le Pen was expected to easily pass the first round and pulled exceedingly close to Macron in the second, whereas her father lost handily to Chirac who received 80% of the vote.
EU Response To Right-Wing Governments
In response to extreme cases like Hungary and Poland, the European Union has imposed certain penalties designed to cut off EU benefits: for instance, the executive EU Commission withheld
€36 billion of COVID-recovery money from Poland and €7 billion from Hungary earlier in the year, citing corruption and anti-LGBTQ policies as its rationale. In September, the Commission proposed suspending more money from Hungary, but also provided the possibility for a compromise that would allow Hungary to receive funding if it implements necessary reforms. The EU mechanism for fund suspension was created in 2020 after growing pressure to impose consequences on member states that disregarded basic EU values such as human rights and equality, but it has nevertheless been challenging to gauge exactly when funds should be restricted. Furthermore, Hungary has used its veto power to block EU items in retaliation, including a key aid package to Ukraine.
What Are the Causes of This Surge?
The most recent rise in hard-right populism comes from candidates who play on a sense of fear and permanent crisis, combining nativism with rejection of the establishment and calling for popular sovereignty while opposing the values of liberal democracy such as separation of powers or an independent media.
This trend can be traced back to the socio-economic upheavals of the 1960s, when movements such as secularization created openings for far-right parties to seize on cultural issues and launch their opposition to inter-European integration, whether political, economical, or social. Their appeal also gradually weakened traditional center-right parties, which appeared lackluster in comparison to the fiery rhetoric of the extremes.
Such candidates have succeeded in becoming more mainstream by steadily toning down rhetoric that may have alienated them in the past. Marine Le Pen, who originally called for a “Frexit” from the EU and a departure from the Eurozone, sought to soften her image by focusing her campaign on issues such as inflation and purchasing power. Behind this facade, however, her views are nonetheless hostile to EU cohesion and her anti-Islam platform remains firmly in place. This strategy proved effective for Meloni as well. Parties once on the fringes are now gaining respectability, their places normalized as it becomes increasingly common to see them competing with established mainstream parties and a common fixture on national media.
This trend indicates that the vision of a closely integrated Europe, touted by leaders such as Macron and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, is increasingly at risk of failure. Indeed, Macron, an ardent supporter of a sovereign, democratic EU, faces significant domestic discontent that threatens to derail his goals by 2027.
Presently, the electoral far right appears poised to further damage democracy in the EU—but perhaps more hopefully, the threat to each country varies. Most concerning is Hungary, the EU’s enfant terrible where one right wing party rules alone, without a restraining coalition, and which has been downgraded by Freedom House from “free” to “partly free.” However, most countries do not face this direct challenge. In Meloni’s case, for instance, internal divisions among the governing coalition poses a barrier to policy implementation. In France and Sweden, the right-wing parties similarly face constraints and can only indirectly exert influence at the moment.
In addition, despite victory at the ballot box, most populist parties in Europe (on the right or left) remain broadly unpopular. Meloni was catapulted to victory in Italy, but the election saw only 64% of voters participate, 10% lower than in the previous election.
Figure 1: Despite electoral victory, many right-wing populist parties in Europe remain unpopular.
Though right-wing extremism has undoubtedly created fissures in the strength of EU democracy, there still remains time to beat back the worst consequences if countries harness their willpower to address the problem and take action now.