Biden Must Stand With Japan In East China Sea

By Noah Harrigan

There is no doubt that China is readying itself to upset the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite a 2016 ruling by the United Nations that struck down Chinese maritime claims that contradict the UN Convention on Law of the Sea, Beijing has continued to consolidate its maritime power in the region. Most notably, the Chinese coast guard has claimed a myriad of territories in the South China Sea. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia are just a few of the nations threatened by China’s “nine-dash line,” which asserts sovereignty over almost all of the South China Sea. Japan has faced similar challenges in the East China Sea.

In what has been dubbed the “salami slicing strategy” for its slow and gradual nature, China has been strengthening its claims for years by building military installments on artificial islands and patrolling disputed areas with its coast guard. However, recent developments display an increased assertiveness by the Chinese. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ran military exercises in the South China Sea in January and began another round of similar exercises on March 1st. This comes on top of a Chinese law enacted in February which would allow its coast guard ships to fire upon foreign ships in territories it claims as its own.

The Threat to Japanese Sovereignty

One of China’s major maritime disputes is over control of the Senkaku Islands, which lie 170 kilometers to the northeast of Taiwan. Having annexed the islands in 1895, Japan currently administers them. After a 1968 United Nations report showed that oil and other valuable resources were in the Senkaku Islands’ exclusive economic zone, China announced its own claims to the islands.

In recent years, the PLA Navy and Air Force have intensified their pressure campaign against Tokyo with near-constant encroachments upon Japanese territory in the East China Sea. The annual number of times the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) has scrambled fighter jets has increased from under 200 in 2004 to 947 times in 2019. Over 70% of those scrambles occurred in Japan’s southwest air zone, which includes the Senkaku Islands; 675 of them were in response to Chinese incursions, with the rest being by Russia.

Many military experts note that this is wearing out the JASDF, whose fleet is about a sixth of the size of China’s. To offset this disadvantage, Japan recently bought 105 F-35s from Washington, an upgrade on the F-15Js which currently make up the majority of the JASDF’s fighter jet forces. However, China is considering limits on rare earth metal exports essential to F-35 production—a clear indication of China’s view of Japan and the United States as strategic competitors in the region.

The aforementioned law allowing Chinese coast guard ships to fire on foreign ships applies to China’s claims on the Senkaku islands. Beijing appears to be ready to exercise these new powers, too; a Chinese court guard ship with a “cannon-like weapon” has recently been spotted in Japanese waters around the Senkakus. In response, Japan has given the go-ahead for its coast guard to use weapons in the case of an invasion of the Senkakus. Tokyo has also ordered new transport ships to support troops on small outlying islands, a clear signal of intent to defend the Senkakus.

Why Biden’s Response Matters

It would be an understatement to say the Japanese-American alliance is very strong—Ambassador Mike Mansfield famously called it the “most important relationship in the world, bar none.” Recent cooperation on Indo-Pacific security has strengthened ties even further. However, China is deeply aware of this relationship—and knows how it can use it to test America’s loyalty to its allies.

If Washington shows any reluctance to defend the Senkaku Islands, it would be devastating to global and regional perceptions of American credibility. While this may sound immaterial at first, it would have serious implications for stability in the Indo-Pacific region. If the United States does not commit to upholding one of its strongest and longest-lasting alliances, America’s allies in the South China Sea and other potential partners such as the Philippines and Vietnam would quickly lose faith in American promises. At best, this would undermine cooperation between these countries and the United States; at worst, it would drive them into the hands of China, a fear which was almost realized last February, when the Philippines briefly cancelled—and then reinstated—an important military agreement with the United States.

Abandoning a key ally on a seemingly minor issue such as the Senkakus would also embolden Chinese attempts to control Taiwan and the South China Sea, which carries approximately one-third of all global shipping. This would further force countries into close relations with China while undermining perceptions of America’s commitment to the rule of international law, which China is in violation of.

What Biden Has Done So Far — And What Remains To Be Done

So far, Biden’s response has been extremely promising. The return of Obama’s “pivot to Asia”, which sought to build strong partnerships in Asia in order to contain China, clearly highlights Biden’s priorities. More substantively, Biden has taken a strong stance on the Senkakus, reaffirming the security treaty between Japan and America and asserting that the Senkakus are covered by it. He has also continued naval exercises and freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, a move which Southeast Asian allies have found reassuring. Joint exercises with Japan in response to Chinese encroachments are similarly encouraging. This March, Biden will virtually hold the first ever summit of “the Quad”, an informal coalition of India, Australia, Japan, and the United States, while seeking to distribute vaccines across the Indo-Pacific—a clear bid to show the benefits of aligning with the United States. 

However, Biden must go further to show “costly signals”—backing his words with action to defend the Senkakus—if he wants to prevent armed conflict. First and foremost, America must write Japan a blank check for support in the East China Sea. With Japan considering stationing troops on the Senkakus, Washington must be willing to help supply those troops, construct fortifications, and perform joint operations if necessary. Additionally, as Lieutenant General Kevin Schneider has suggested, U.S. Forces Japan should also develop capabilities to deploy to the Senkakus itself, which would demonstrate a clear intent to get involved in the event of Chinese invasion. Finally, an elevation of Japanese-American security cooperation, perhaps in the form of joint amphibious landing exercises or U.S. Air Force jets operating alongside the JASDF against Chinese aerial incursions, is necessary to demonstrate Biden’s commitment to the security treaty.

By clearly showing the American commitment to defending the Senkakus, these “costly signals” should deter China from further provocations in the area. In fact, international relations analysts often state that war is frequently caused by perceptions of weakness or a lack of resolve between two nations. One of the most prominent examples of this was the Iraq War: Saddam Hussein incorrectly believed that America would not invade Iraq in 2002, so he refused to accept American demands to comply with United Nations resolutions. This, of course, led to the invasion of Iraq. Had Saddam known of America’s resolve to invade Iraq if he did not comply, he would have acquiesced. Similar logic will prevail in the Senkakus; both sides understand the great costs of conflict.

However, in the event that China does attempt an armed action in the Senkakus, Biden should honor America’s promises in the security treaty and, alongside Japanese forces, engage Chinese forces on or around the island. This sort of limited conflict—similar to that of last year’s Indo-Chinese border conflict—would uphold Biden’s diplomatic commitments without provoking full-scale war. 

And yes, any conflict over the Senkakus would remain limited. Since World War 2, there have been many border conflicts between major powers, such as the Kargil War between India and Pakistan and the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969, but none of these have evolved into full-fledged war. The fact that the Senkakus are relatively isolated islands further reduces the chance for spillovers; a conflict there would be easy to contain.

This is not to say that the United States and China are now enemies. Close ties of friendship built over decades of cultural and economic exchange link the Chinese and American peoples together. Rather, Biden must thread the needle by simultaneously opposing the Chinese Communist Party in the domains of security and human rights abuses while cooperating on issues such as climate change and trade. Indeed, with enough engagement in other areas, a Sino-American rapprochement on security issues may be well on the way.